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1In a widely cited paper, Sharpe (1990) has formulated a model of corpo-
rate borrowing under asymmetric information which provides a theoretical
explanation of long-term bank-…rm relationships. While the model is con-
ceptually important and makes a main feature of actual lending relationships
amenable to theoretical analysis, the analysis o¤ered in the paper is not cor-
rect. The purpose of this note is to point out the error and to provide a correct
analysis of the problem. Furthermore, I want to draw attention to the work
by Fischer (1990), who has studied a simpler version of the same problem
independently and correctly, though not with full mathematical rigour.
Sharpe (1990) and Fischer (1990) consider a model of repeated corporate
borrowing under adverse selection, in which lenders obtain inside information
about their borrowers’ quality. This inside information gives existing lenders
an informational advantage over potential competitors at the re…nancing
stage and reduces ex-post competition. Hence, an initial situation of compe-
tition between symmetrically informed lenders turns into one of asymmetric
information once one lender has attracted the business and dealt with the
customer for some time. Since borrowers and lenders rationally anticipate
that the borrower will be “informationally captured” in the relationship in
the future, initial …nance is o¤ered at a discount which re‡ects the expected
mark up on future terms of …nance.
In the absence of binding long-term contracts, these future terms of …-
nance are determined at the re…nancing stage by competition between the
inside lender and potential outside competitors. The analysis of this inter-
action – a contract o¤er game under asymmetric information – provided by
Sharpe (1990) is incorrect. In Proposition 1, he identi…es two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria for one version of this game, in Proposition 2 one pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium for another version. However, these games do not
have pure-strategy equilibria at all.
The principal reason for the non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria in
this situation is a “winner’s curse” type phenomenon, known from the the-
ory of competitive bidding (see, e.g., Wilson (1967), Milgrom and Weber
(1982)).1 Under asymmetric information about the common value of an ob-
ject – here: the pro…tability of a lending contract – the fact that a bid wins
1The mathematical theory of bidding under asymmetric information relevant for the
competition problem in Sharpe (1990) has been developed by Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Mil-
grom and Weber (1983).
2contains information about the value of the object. In particular, the higher
the bid by an individual bidder – here: the lower the interest rate o¤ered
by a single lender – the higher is not only the probability of obtaining the
object, but also that the object, if obtained, is estimated by others to be
of lower value. Therefore, bidding in such situations must not only take
individual private information into account, but also the information that
would be revealed by the fact that the bid wins over the others. This limits
the viability of standard overbidding (undercutting) strategies à la Bertrand,
without completely eliminating the incentives to use them. As a consequence,
pure strategies, which are directly vulnerable to overbidding (undercutting),
cannot constitute an equilibrium. However, mixed-strategy equilibria exist,
because through optimal randomization competitors can balance the gains
from increasing the bid’s success probability and the losses from decreasing
the expected value of the object conditional on winning.
The similarities between banking competition for corporate customers
and bidding in auctions with common values have …rst been explored by
Broecker (1990) in a model of interbank competition under imperfect in-
formation acquisition. In particular, Broecker (1990) studies the nature of
the resulting mixed-strategy equilibria if the number of competing banks
becomes large. Rajan (1992), which enriches the Fischer-Sharpe model by
the possibility of long-term lending, …nds a mixed-strategy equilibrium in a
situation similar to that of Sharpe (1990).
Equilibrium in mixed strategies is the appropriate formalization of the
intuition of “uneven competition” between inside and outside lenders for the
provision of continuation …nance. While informed lenders can be expected
to capture some informational rent in this game, it is implausible that they
can completely dictate the terms of the contract. Yet, any deterministic
countero¤er to such dictatorial insider o¤ers by an outsider would, in turn,
fall prey to selective undercutting by the insider, leaving the outsider with
losses. However, randomization of o¤ers allows the outsider to keep the rents
extracted by the insider in check, without exposing herself too directly to
the thrust of the insider’s superior information.2 Empirically, therefore, the
model predicts a limited informational capture of borrowers in bank-…rm re-
lationships, with interest rates charged above the market rate and occasional
2Since contract o¤ers by competing lenders are not announced publicly, there is no
incentive to change the random contract o¤ers once competing o¤ers have been observed.
Hence, the standard objection to the plausibility of mixed strategies in the case of posted
pricing (cf. Tirole (1988), p. 215) does not apply in this context.
3switching of borrowers in equilibrium. Although …rm-level studies of pricing
and termination in lending relationships are still rare and sometimes di¢cult
to interpret, these predictions seem to correspond to observed behaviour in
bank-…rm relationships (see, e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1994), Angelini, Di
Salvo, Ferri (1998), Ongena and Smith (1997), and Degryse and van Cayseele
(2000).
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. Section I summarizes
the model formulated by Sharpe, using the terminology of the paper as much
as possible. Section II describes and brie‡y discusses the mixed-strategy
equilibrium for a slightly simpli…ed version of the model. The appendix
contains the proof, which may be of some more general interest, because it
derives the equilibrium properties directly, instead of adapting the general
results of Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber (1983).
1 The Model
There is a continuum of …rms (not necessarily risk-neutral) who all want to
carry out a sequence of two investment projects. For each …rm, the project
at time t =1 ;2 transforms an investment of It at the beginning of the period
(It is chosen by the …rm) into a random return at the end of the period. This
return depends on the …rm’s quality, q,a n di sg i v e nb y
(
Xt = g(It)It with probability pq
0 with probability 1 ¡ pq;
where g is strictly decreasing and concave.3 For each …rm, returns for project
1 and 2 are stochastically independent, and the same is true across …rms.
There are two possible qualities of …rms, q = L;H,w i t hpL <p H. The pro-
portion of high quality …rms, H,i sµ 2 (0;1), and this is common knowledge.
Firms do not know their own quality.
Because the key issue in Sharpe’s (1990) paper is the problem of infor-
mational capture in relationship lending and because the variable investment
case is a trivial extension, I assume from now on that project sizes I1 and I2
are …xed. Furthermore, to save on unnecessary indices, I consider the bor-
rowing problem of one given …rm, randomly drawn from the pool described
3Clearly, one needs that g(I) ¸ 1+r for some I.
4above.4
The …rm has no own funds, but can borrow from competing banks. Banks
are risk-neutral, compete à la Bertrand, and have unlimited access to funds
at the net interest rate r per period. Like the …rm, banks do not know the
…rm’s quality at the beginning of period 1. However, if a bank …nances the
…rm’s …rst project, it perfectly observes the outcome of the project, which
provides information about the …rm’s quality. Denote by
° =
(
S if …rst period result is X1
F if …rst period result is 0
the …rm’s performance in the …rst project. It is assumed that the …rst project
is …nanced by at most one bank,5 which becomes the “inside bank”. “Outside
banks”, who have not provided …rst round …nance, each get an identical,
costless noisy signal of °, e °,d e … n e db y




with 0 · © < 1. In the limiting case of ©=1inside and outside banks are
both perfectly informed about the …rst-period outcome; this case is trivial. If
©=0 , the outside banks do not observe anything. Sharpe (1990) considers
both the case of e ° being observed by the inside bank (his Proposition 2) and
of e ° not being observed by the inside bank (Proposition 1). Both analyses
are similar and contain a similar error; to economise on space and because
t h ec a s eo fu n o b s e r v e de ° may be less intuitive, I focus here on the latter case.
The key assumption concerning the strategic interaction among the play-
ers is the absence of binding long-term contracting possibilities.As forcefully
argued by Sharpe (1990), this absence of long-term contracts is the interest-
ing scenario to consider: without it the analysis would reduce to standard
competitive pricing and miss the important point in bank relationships. The
dynamic game played between the …rm and the banks then has the following
structure:
4This is e¤ectively as in Sharpe (1990). Investment size and the description of the
continuum are rightly ignored in most of his argument.
5For an analysis of funding by several banks, see von Thadden (1992) and Detragiache,
Garella, and Guiso (2000).
5t =1 1. Each bank j announces a short-term lending rate r1
j.
2. The …rm chooses one bank, borrows and invests I1.
3. The …rm repays (1 + r1)I1 i¤ ° = S. Outside banks observe e °.
t =2 4. Simultaneously, the inside bank o¤ers a second-period interest
rate r2
i = r2
i(°) and each outside bank h o¤ers a second-
period interest rate r2
h = r2
h(e °).
5. The …rm chooses an o¤er and invests I2. If indi¤erent, the …rm
stays with the inside bank.
6. The …rm repays (1 + r2)I2 i¤ the second project has been successful.
The presentation of this game is slightly di¤erent from the one in Sharpe
(1990), but both games are identical (with the restriction to one …rm in my
version).6 Apart from the absence of long-term contracting possibilities, two
other assumptions of the model are
1. The …rm consumes any pro…t after the …rst period.
2. Outstanding debt after a failure of the …rst project is forgiven.
The …rst assumption excludes the possibility of using retained earnings
for investment and signaling purposes in the second period. The second elim-
inates all contractual links between the two periods, in particular, …rms can
switch freely from one bank to another despite their credit history.7 While
6The reader may suspect a di¤erence in substance in stage 4, where Sharpe (1990)
assumes that “each bank j makes o¤ers of credit r2
j(°) to its previous customers, contingent
upon the observed outcomes °. Each bank j observes a signal e °(f) of the …rst-period
performance of those …rms that borrowed from other banks. It also observes the lending
policies (r2
h(°)) of their banks, but not individual o¤ers. It then makes credit o¤ers (r2
jh(e °))
to customers of each bank h 6= j.” Despite the wording, since outsiders do not observe the
inside o¤ers, insiders and outsiders e¤ectively move simultanously. The fact that outsiders
observe “lending policies” is simply the Nash assumption.
7The second assumption is innocuous as long as X2 is su¢ciently large relative to X1.
Then, here as in practice, …rms can switch banks even when in …nancial distress, if the
new bank rolls over the old debt. The more restrictive assumption is the …rst one, because
a successful …rm has an interest to put up X1 ¡ (1 + r1)I1 as a contribution towards the
second project, thereby signaling its type (by construction, a ° = F …rm cannot do that).
The problem disappears if one assumes that X1 is su¢ciently small relative to I1 (which
is reasonable, because the model wants to explain the lock-in of once unpro…table but now
successful …rms). An alternative model in which the …rst assumption can be relaxed would
be to assume that the inside bank observes the …rm’s quality q, whereas the …rm and the
outside banks only observe the project outcome °. Then the informational asymmetry is
preserved, but signaling is ruled out by construction.
6these assumptions are somewhat extreme, they are useful simpli…cations to
highlight the role of intertemporal informational constraints in bank compe-
tition.8
Before analysing the model, it is useful to introduce, just as Sharpe (1990),
some benchmark loan rates and notation. Let
p = µpH +( 1¡ µ)pL (1)
p(S)=
Pr (° = S &s u c c e s si nt = 2 )
Pr (° = S)
=
µp2





Pr (° = F &s u c c e s si nt = 2 )
Pr (° = F)
=
µ(1 ¡ pH)pH +( 1¡ µ)(1 ¡ pL)pL
1 ¡ p
(3)
denote the success probabilities of the …rm’s second project, if there is, re-
spectively, no information about …rst-period performance (equation (1)), if
the …rst-period outcome has been observed to be good (equation (2)), and if
the …rst-period outcome has been observed to be bad (equation (3)).
Similarly, by Bayes’ rule, the success probabilities conditional on the noisy
observation e ° are given by
p( e S)=Pr (e ° = e S & X
2
¯ ¯ ¯ e ° = e S)
=
Pr (e ° = e S & X2)




2 +( 1¡ pH)1¡©
2 )pH +( 1¡ µ)(pL
1+©




2 +( 1¡ pH)1¡©
2 )+( 1¡ µ)(pL
1+©
2 +( 1¡ pL)1¡©
2 )
=
(1 ¡ ©)p +2 © p(S)p
(1 ¡ ©) + 2©p
and
p( e F)=Pr (e ° = e F & X
2
¯ ¯ ¯ e ° = e F)
=
Pr (e ° = e F & X2)
Pr (e ° = e F)
=
(1 ¡ ©)p +2 © p(F)(1 ¡ p)
(1 ¡ ©) + 2©(1 ¡ p)
8For an analysis of long-term contractual links in this type of problem, see von Thadden
(1995).
7Using these probabilities, one can de…ne hypothetical zero-pro…t loan






















rS <r e S <r p <r e F <r F: (9)
The …nal assumption is that (1 + rF)I2 · X2, i.e. that second-period
lending is pro…table even if the …rm is known to have failed in the …rst
period.9
The natural solution concept for this game is Perfect Bayesian Nash equi-
librium (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).10 The interesting part of
the analysis of this game is the bidding competition between banks in the
second period (Propositions 1 and 2 in Sharpe (1990)). The …rm’s response
to competing bids is completely mechanic, and bank competition in stage 1
is standard bidding under symmetric information for the informational rent
to be reaped in t =2 .
The bidding game in the second period is a Bayesian game whose informa-
tion structure (i.e. players’ types and priors) has been determined in period 1.
Denote pure strategies of outside banks by rh = rh(e °),l e tro = ro(e °)=m i n h
rh(e °), and denote a pure strategy of the inside bank by ri = ri(°).
Proposition 1: The bidding game in stage 4 has no Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium in pure strategies.
Proof: The proof is by contradiction.
9It is straightforward to analyse the model without this assumption, in which case bad
performers are excluded from continuation …nance by the inside bank.
10This is as in Sharpe (1990), although he does not state this explicitly.
81) Suppose that ro(e °) <r e ° for e ° = e S or e ° = e F. Such an o¤er attracts
at best (if ro(e °) <r i(S))t h eS-a n dt h eF-t y p e… r m .I nt h i sc a s e ,e ° is an
unbiased estimator of the …rm’s ° and the winning outside bank would make
a strictly positive expected loss. Contradiction.
2) Suppose that ri(S) > max(ro( e S);r o( e F)). By 1) and (9), a deviation
b yt h ei n s i d eb a n kt omax(ro( e S);r o( e F)) would raise expected pro…ts on the
S-type strictly above zero. Contradiction.
3) Suppose that ro(e °) <r i(S) <r F for e ° = e S or e ° = e F.B y 2 ) ,
min(ro( e S);r o( e F)) <r i(S) · max(ro( e S);r o( e F)). By the optimality of ri(S),
we must have ri(S)=m a x ( ro( e S);r o( e F)). Because ri(F) · ri(S) (which is
smaller than rF)i si m p o s s i b l e ,max(ro( e S);r o( e F)) attracts exactly the F-type
…rm in equilibrium. Contradiction to max(ro( e S);r o( e F)) <r F.
4) Suppose that ri(S) · ro(e °) <r F for e ° = e S or e ° = e F. Then the
outside banks’ bid attracts at most the F-type …rm as a customer. Clearly,
ri(F) ¸ rF(>r o(e °)) (otherwise, the inside bank would make an expected
loss on the F-…rm). Hence, the outside o¤er attracts exactly the F-…rm and
makes a strictly positive expected loss because ro(e °) <r F.
5) Points 3 and 4 imply either directly that ri(S) ¸ rF or that ro(e °) ¸ rF
for e ° = e S and e ° = e F. If the latter is true, the optimality of ri(S) again
implies ri(S) ¸ rF. Clearly, also ri(F) ¸ rF.
If min(ro( e S);r o( e F)) >r i(S), then the inside bank would do better with a
bid of ri(S)+" for " su¢ciently small, because this would allow it to realize
higher pro…ts per loan without loosing customers.
If min(ro( e S);r o( e F)) = ri(S), then any of the winning outside banks would
do better with a bid of ri(S) ¡ " for " su¢ciently small, because this would
allow it to attract the S-…rm, on which it makes a strictly positive expected
pro…t given its information.
Suppose, therefore, …nally that min(ro( e S);r o( e F)) <r i(S).B y2 ) ,
max(ro( e S);r o( e F)) ¸ ri(S). Because of competition from the inside bank,
ri(F) · max(ro( e S);r o( e F)) or max(ro( e S);r o( e F)) = rF. Hence, the winning
outside banks for the signal e ° with ro(e °)=m a x ( ro( e S);r o( e F)) make no pro…t
on their o¤er. Because re F <r F · ri(S), they would be strictly better o¤
undercutting ri(S) slightly, thus attracting both types of the …rm.
Proposition 1 shows that Sharpe’s (1990) Proposition 1, in which he pro-
poses two pure-strategiy equilibria as the solutions of the bidding game, is
9wrong. The problem with his proof is that he correctly rules out a number
of pure-strategy combinations, but not all of them, and then concludes that
what is left must be an equilibrium.
The outcome described in Proposition 1 is a classical example of the
winner’s curse familiar from Bertrand competition and auction theory: if
an outside bank wins the bidding contest, it must take into account that
its success is due to its bid being attractive, but also to the fact that the
inside bank did not want to bid more aggressively. Hence, the very fact of
winning contains information that a rational player must take into account.
Typically, in such situations pure-strategy equilibria do not exist.
The proof of Proposition 1 can easily be adapted to the case of discrete
action spaces (where interest rates must be expressed in terms of a smallest
unit), as long as the interest rate grid is not too coarse. The non-existence
problem is, therefore, more fundamental than the simple open-set problem
which causes non-existence in Bertrand competition or …rst-price auctions
under complete information and which disappears with discretization.
A similar argument to the one given above shows that Sharpe’s (1990)
Proposition 2, which deals with the case of e ° being observable by the inside
bank, is incorrect, as well. Intuitively, the case of observable e ° may be easier
to understand than the one of unobservable e °, which is why the explicit
proof given here considers the latter case. If e ° is unobservable to the inside
bank, inside and outside banks all observe a signal unknown to the other.
Hence, it may seem that all banks can condition deterministically on their
signal and thereby still obtain su¢cient randomness to rule out deviations,
as, for example, in Gibbons and Katz (1991) in the context of labor markets.
Proposition 1 shows that this intuition is not correct: the fact that one
competitor’s action cannot be predicted by the others is not enough, the
competitors need to randomize actively. In the case of e ° being observable to
the inside bank, however, the inside bank faces no noise, and randomization
is even more plausible a priori.
2 Equilibrium
To simplify notation and some of the calculations, I consider here the case
of extreme informational asymmetry ©=0 , in which the outside banks have
no information. The analysis of the more general case introduced above is
a relatively straightforward extension. Furthermore, I suppose that there is
10only one outside bank, which simpli…es the analysis, but still conveys the full
intuition.
Proposition 2: T h eB a y e s i a ng a m eb e t w e e nt h ei n s i d ea n do n eo u t s i d e
bank in stage 4 of the dynamic bank competition game with ©=0has a
unique mixed-strategy equilibrium. The inside bank’s equilibrium strategy is
to o¤er r(F)=rF with certainty and is an atomless distribution on [rp;r F]




p(S)(1 + rp) ¡ (1 + r)
(p(S)(1 + r) ¡ (1 + r))2: (10)
The outside bank’s equilibrium strategy has a point mass of 1¡p(S) at r = rF




The proof of the proposition is given in the appendix. The strategy of the
proof is to …rst characterise equilibrium strategies assuming that they exist,
which yields a unique characterization, and then verify that the behaviour
found constitutes indeed a Nash equilibrium. It is therefore not necessary to
invoke the existence theorem of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986).
Proposition 2 shows that …rms switch banks in equilibrium. In fact, a
bad …rm switches whenever it receives an o¤er, which occurs with probabil-
ity p(S), but even good …rms switch occasionally, namely with probability R rF
rp (1 ¡ HS
i (r))ho(r)dr. Proposition 2 also shows that in equilibrium, full
competition is only e¤ective for bad …rms. In particular, the inside bank
always o¤ers the zero-pro…t interest rate rF to bad …rms. Yet, with prob-
ability p(S) bad …rms are even getting excessively favorable terms on their
loan, which happens when the outside bank underbids the inside bank. In
this case, the outside bank makes a strict loss on the loan. Yet, the bank
is neither acting irrationally nor recklessly: in order to put up a limited de-
gree of competition for the good risks it must optimally take into account
the occasional ‡op. On average, the outside bank puts up the maximum
competition possible and makes zero expected pro…ts.
By the same token, since competition by the outside bank is limited, the
inside bank makes positive expected pro…ts on the good risks. Since the
inside bank is indi¤erent between the interest rates in the interval [rp;r F],
these pro…ts are proportional to (rp ¡ rS), which can be interpreted as a
11measure of adverse selection in the market. In fact, as seen following equa-
tion (22) in the appendix, overall the inside bank’s expected pro…ts on good
risks (expectation taken over the outside bank’s randomization) are given by
p(S)(rp ¡rS). Hence, they are proportional to the success probability of the
good …rm. This is reasonable, although Proposition 2 also exhibits a coun-
terveiling e¤ect: the higher p(S), the tougher the competition by the outside
bank. Moreover, the inside bank’s pricing strategy, as given by (10), is quite
intuitive: because hS
i is decreasing, most of the pricing occurs at moderate
pro…t levels (slightly above rp), with occasional attempts to really squeeze
the …rm (prices up to rF).
Concerning the robustness of the model, Proposition 2 can be easily
adapted to cover the case (1 + rF)I2 >X 2, in which second-period lend-
ing is not pro…table if the …rm is known to have failed in the …rst period.11
In this case, the inside bank does not continue …nancing a failed …rm and
randomizes atomlessly over the range [rp;X2) with a point mass at X2 for
the successful …rm. The outside bank does not bid at all with some proba-
bility ¹, and with probability 1 ¡ ¹ it bids and randomizes atomlessly over
the whole range [rp;X2].
11This case has been considered by Fischer (1990) and Rajan (1992).
12Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
Let H
°
i , ° 2f S;Fg, denote the c.d.f. of the equilibrium mixed strategy
of the inside bank, given its information °,a n dHo the c.d.f. of the equilib-
rium mixed strategy of the outside bank. As usual, H
°
i and Ho are weakly
monotone and continuous from the right, i.e. H(b r)=Pr (r · b r) for each of
the three mixed strategies. De…ne H(r¡) = limt%r H(t). Finally, let
`
°
i =i n f fr;H
°
i (r) > 0g;°2f S;Fg (12)
u
°
i =s u p fr;H
°
i (r) < 1g;°2f S;Fg (13)
`o =i n f fr;Ho(r) > 0g (14)
uo =s u p fr;Ho(r) < 1g: (15)
denote the lower and upper end point, respectively, of the supports of the
three mixed strategies. Without loss of generality we can assume that [`;u] µ
[0; X2
I2 ¡1] for the three di¤erent distributions considered (no repayment can
be greater than what is available in the good state).
It useful to write out and label each player’s expected payo¤ for any
interest rate quoted, given the mixed strategy of the other:
P
°
i (r)=( 1 ¡ Ho(r
¡))[p(°)(1 + r) ¡ (1 + r)];°2f S;Fg (16)
Po(r)=p(1 ¡ H
S
i (r))[p(S)(1 + r) ¡ (1 + r)] + (17)
(1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ H
F
i (r))[p(F)(1 + r) ¡ (1 + r)]:
The proof now characterizes the distributions H
°
i and Ho in a sequence
of several, more or less simple steps.
Step 1: `
°
i ¸ r° for ° 2f S;Fg.
Proof. Obvious.
Step 2: `o ¸ rp.
Proof. Because rF >r p,a n yo ¤ e rr<r p attracts, by Step 1, the F-…rm.
Therefore, the pool of applicants has at best success probability p.
Step 3: `S
i ¸ rp.
Proof. By Step 2, putting mass to the left of rp cannot be optimal.
13Step 4: uo ¸ uS
i .
Proof. Suppose that uo <u S
i . Then the inside bank makes zero expected
pro…ts on all o¤ers r(S) 2 (uo;u S
i ]. However, by Step 3, the inside bank
makes strictly positive expected pro…ts on the S-…rm.
Step 5: HS
i is continuous on [`S
i ;u S
i ).
Proof. Suppose that there is a b r 2 [`S
i ;u S
i ) at which HS
i is discontinuous,
i.e. with HS
i (b r¡) <H S
i (b r). Then, by (17), Po(b r¡) >P o(b r),b e c a u s ep(S)(1+
r) ¡ (1 + r) > 0 on [`S
i ;u S
i ) by Step 3.
By the right-hand continuity of H
°
i ;° 2f S;Fg,t h e r ei sa n">0 such
that Ho(b r¡)=Ho(r)=constant on [b r; b r + "]. Therefore, PS
i is continuous
at b r and strictly increasing on [b r; b r + "]. Hence, HS
i can have no mass on
[b r; b r + "], which implies that HS
i (b r¡)=HS
i (b r). Contradiction.
Note that the proof of Step 5 does not apply to HF
i , because we do not




Proof. Suppose that uS
i <` F
i . This implies that the inside bank never
makes an o¤er r 2 (uS
i ;` F
i ).
(a) Suppose that uS
i <u o.T h e nHo can have no mass on [uS
i ;` F
i ),b e c a u s e
for every o¤er r 2 [uS
i ;` F






would be strictly better for
the outside banks. Then the (positive) mass of Ho on [uS
i ;u o] lies on [`F
i ;u o].
In particular, Ho is continuous at uS
i .
Consider the following deviation from HS
i :L e t±>0 and ">0 be given
and small. Let M" be the mass of HS
i on [uS
i ¡";uS
i ]. The deviation strategy
is identical to HS
i on [`S
i ;u S
i ¡"), has zero mass on [uS
i ¡";`F
i ¡±) and point
mass M" on `F
i ¡ ±.










i ¡ ±) ¡ (Ho(u
S








The …rst of the two terms in (18) (which corresponds to the total gain
from the deviation) is strictly positive for ± su¢ciently small. The second
term (corresponding to the total loss from the deviation) tends to 0 for " ! 0
14by the continuity of Ho at uS
i . Hence, the deviation is strictly pro…table for
± and " small enough.
(b) Suppose that uS
i = uo. Consider the following deviation from Ho:L e t
±>0 and ">0 be given and small. Let N" be the mass of Ho on [uo¡";uo].
Move all mass of [uo ¡";uo) to `F
i ¡±. Then the expected net gain from this





i ¡ uo ¡ ±) ¡ p(H
S
i (uo) ¡ H
S
i (uo ¡ "))(p(S)(1 + uo) ¡ (1 + r))
i
;
where the second term now tends to 0 for " ! 0 by Step 5.
Step 7: uF
i · uo.
Proof. Suppose that uF
i >u o. Then the inside bank makes zero expected
pro…ts on the F-…rm (otherwise uF
i = X2
I2 ¡ 1, and, by Steps 4 and 5, the
outside bank would obtain a jump increase in expected pro…ts by shifting
the mass of [uo ¡ ";uo] for any small " to a rate strictly above uo). Hence,
`F
i ¸ uo.B yS t e p4a n d6 ,`F
i ¸ uo. This and the zero expected pro…ts imply
`F
i = rF.
Consider the following deviation from Ho:L e t">0 be given and small.
Let L" be the mass of Ho on [uo¡";uo]. The deviation strategy is identical to
Ho on [`o;u o¡") and concentrates all the remaining mass L" on 1
2(rF+uF
i )= :
®. By the de…nition of uF
i we have HF
i (®) < 1.




4(1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ H
F
i (®))p(F)(® ¡ rF) ¡ p (1 ¡ H
S
i (rF ¡ "))
| {z }
! 0 for "!0 by Step 5





Intuitively, since mass is taken away below rF, the outside bank only
gains if ° = F.
Remark: If one wants to prove uF





i ¸ rF.S u p p o s et h a tuF
i >r F. Since the outside bank can
obtain strictly positive expected pro…ts by choosing r ´ 1
2(rF +uF
i ),i tm u s t
make strictly positive pro…ts also with Ho.B yS t e p7 ,uo >r F;h e n c e ,a l s o
HF






















which is a contradiction to the …nding that Ho makes strictly positive
expected pro…ts.
Step 8 implies that ri(F)=rF with probability 1; in particular, the inside
bank makes zero expected pro…ts on the F-…rm.
Step 9: uo = uS
i = rF.
Proof. Suppose that uo >r F. Then choosing ri(F)=1
2(rF + uo) with
probability 1 would yield the inside bank strictly positive expected pro…ts on
the F-…rm. The equality for uS
i follows from Steps 4 and 6.
Step 10: The outside bank makes zero expected pro…ts.
Proof. By Steps 8 and 9, (17) simpli…es to
Po(r)=p(1 ¡ H
S
i (r))[p(S)(1 + r) ¡ (1 + r)] + (20)
(1 ¡ p)[p(F)(1 + r) ¡ (1 + r)]
on [`o;u o).B yS t e p5 ,Po is continuous on [`o;u o), and by Step 9 we have
Po(u¡
o )=0 .
Step 11: `o = `S
i = rp.
Proof. It is impossible that `o >` S
i , because then the inside bank would
make strictly higher pro…ts if it placed the mass of [`S
i ;` o] on `o. By a similar
argument for the outside bank, `o <` S
i is impossible. Finally, if `o >r p,
the outside bank would make strictly positive expected pro…ts, contradicting
Step 10.
Step 12: Ho is continuous on [rp;r F).
Proof. Suppose that Ho(b r¡) <H o(b r) for some b r 2 [rp;r F).
16Then PS
i (b r) >P S
i (r) for r 2 (b r; b r + "), ">0 su¢ciently small, by the
right-hand continuity of Ho. Hence, HS
i is constant on (b r; b r + "). Therefore,
by (20), Po is strictly increasing on (b r; b r+").B yt h ec o n t i n u i t yo fPo (which
follows from Step 5 and (20)), Po(b r) <P o(b r + "). Hence, Ho can have no
mass on b r.
Step 13: HS
i and Ho are strictly increasing on [rp;r F].
Proof. Suppose that HS
i is constant on some interval [®;b] ½ [rp;r F].L e t
[a;b] ¶ [®;b] be the maximal such interval. By Step 5 and the de…nition of `S
i ,
a>r p.T h e nPo is strictly increasing on [a;b], hence, Ho constant on [a;b).
By the continuity of Ho, PS
i is strictly increasing on [a;b],ac o n t r a d i c t i o nt o
the maximality of [a;b].
The last step has completed the characterization of the mixed strategies,
because it implies that P S
i and Po are constant on [rp;r F]. By the continuity
of Ho and HS
i on [rp;r F), we obtain therefore from (16) and (20) for r 2
[rp;r F)
(1 ¡ Ho(r))[p(S)(1 + r) ¡ (1+ r)] = c (21)
p(1 ¡ H
S
i (r))[p(S)(1 + r) ¡ (1 + r)]
+(1 ¡ p)[p(F)(1 + r) ¡ (1+ r)] = 0: (22)
The constant c in (21) can be determined by substituting any value r 2
[rp;r F) into (21); for r = rp one obtains c = p(S)(rp ¡ rS). Straightforward














for r 2 [rp;r F). One easily checks that HS
i (r
¡
F)=1 ,h e n c e ,HS
i is continuous
on [rp;r F] and given by (23) on all of its domain. On the other hand, (24)
shows that Ho is discontinuous at r = rF with jump 1 ¡ p(S).
17This identi…es a unique mixed strategy pro…le. Because both players
randomize over the whole of [rp;r F], there are no pro…table deviations from
these strategies for either player. Proposition 2 is therefore proved.
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